SRI, details of the 2024 summer sabotage attributed to Russia: a Colombian citizen was affiliated to a network of saboteurs controlled by Russian secret services through intermediaries

Romania has been targeted by Russian sabotage actions, according to the Romanian Intelligence Service.
alfonso sri columbia sabotaj rusia alfonso sri columbia sabotaj rusia
sursa foto: SRI

Romania has been targeted by Russian sabotage actions, announces the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), in a statement issued on Friday evening, giving details about the Colombian citizen affiliated to a widespread network of saboteurs targeting European countries and which was controlled by Russian secret services through intermediaries.

The SRI claims that it managed to prevent a sabotage action that was planned for July-August 2024 and that it identified the bomber before he acted.

  • „This modus operandi is part of the arsenal of hybrid techniques that the Russian Federation uses in Romania, as well as in allied states,” the intelligence service says.
    The SRI said that the Colombian Luis Alfonso Murillo Diosa came to Romania at the end of July precisely to carry out diversionary actions.

The intelligence service claims that the specific modus operandi of the Russian services is evidenced by the involvement of a proxy (intermediary) – acting as an organizer and recruiter on virtual social media platforms – who makes and pays in advance for travel and accommodation reservations and indicates (on encrypted applications) the type of mission, destination and targets.

„The saboteur was instructed to periodically communicate and personally document the entire cycle of activities he was to carry out, certifying them by transmitting images with specific landmarks confirming that the person was acting as instructed.”

SRI press release

Romania was targeted in the July-August period by several such abandoned attempts, with the SRI managing to prevent a sabotage operation from materializing – with the identification of the attacker even before he acted.

This modus operandi is part of the arsenal of hybrid techniques that the Russian Federation uses in Romania, as well as in allied states.

Specifically, on the basis of cooperation with European partner intelligence services, through a complex of its own measures, the SRI was able to quickly identify the Colombian citizen LUIS ALFONSO MURILLO MURILLO DIOSA, who arrived in Romania at the end of July with the aim of carrying out diversionary actions.

SRI has established with certainty the intention of LUIS ALFONSO MURILLO DIOSA to carry out sabotage actions in Romania on the basis of a pre-established instruction, with explicit indication of the targets (on photos previously received by phone).

The information obtained by SRI and promptly forwarded to the Ministry of Interior allowed him to be detained on July 30, 2024, when he was documenting in detail the area of a recyclable materials warehouse in the town of Bragadiru, located in the proximity of several targets assimilated to critical infrastructures (oil extraction wells, gas pipelines or telecommunication towers).

The Colombian national was subsequently detained by the DIICOT and charged with an offense against national security (Article 403 of the Criminal Code, acts of diversion).

The data obtained by the SRI in the intelligence investigation confirms the Colombian citizen’s affiliation to an extensive network of saboteurs targeting European countries, controlled through intermediaries of the Russian secret services. The conclusions of the SRI and the assessments of the European partner services validate the concerted and coordinated nature of the operations on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The specific modus operandi of the Russian services is evidenced by the involvement of a proxy – acting as an organizer and recruiter on virtual social networking platforms – who makes and prepays for travel and accommodation reservations and indicates (on encrypted applications) the type of mission, destination and targets.

The saboteur was instructed to periodically communicate and personally document the entire cycle of activities he was to carry out, certifying them by sending images with specific landmarks confirming that the person was acting according to the instruction received.

At the same time, photo-video documentation was necessary in order to use the data in fake news campaigns on social media platforms, which propagandistically portray large-scale diversionary operations carried out by a supposedly pro-Russian Ukrainian resistance.

The campaigns aimed at inducing panic and distrust of the authorities among the civilian population are pre-planned and launched in an organized manner. Since the saboteur was detained and was no longer able to communicate with the coordinators, they were misled by the fact that a fire caused by a short circuit occurred during the same period, on 01.08.2024, but in the locality of Bragadiru in Teleorman County.

Thus, Russian Telegram channels falsely presented, with images of other fires, the operation targeting the location in Bragadiru, Ilfov, identified as a facility involved in supporting Ukraine’s war effort, the action being attributed to a Ukrainian resistance group that destroyed by arson a „logistic center where fuel was stored fuel that was to be sent to Ukraine”.

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