Historian Armand Goșu: “Putin is the gravedigger of Russia, he has nothing to do with communism, but with criminal psychology, he is mentally dominated by the KGB/ FSB hates those who refuse to die, like Navalny/ Russia is becoming an annex of China, who is not suicidal enough to degrade relations with the West”

Historian Armand Goșu, a specialist in Russian history, launched his three books on Friday at Ovidius University in Constanta, where he held with students and professors about the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin’s future and the impact of propaganda in Russian society. The debate was moderated by Prof. Daniel Citirigă from the Faculty of History and Political Science.

Armand Goșu is a professor at the University of Bucharest, he obtained his PhD in Russian history at the University of Moscow, his thesis was defended in a public session at the Department of Russian History in April 1998. Goșu specialized in the history of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire. In 2006 he was an expert in the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, and from 2010-2012 he was the advisor on the former Soviet space to the then Romanian Foreign Minister Theodor Baconschi.

Armand Goșu recently announced that he was declared a “foreign agent” by Moscow in June 2021, on the same day as US General Ben Hodges.

Key Statements

• Until this war you might have thought that the Russian army was the second best army in the world, very well trained, not good to mess with, now can you say that without a snort of laughter?
• Russia today, which is becoming an appendage, a junior partner of China (…) China is not suicidal enough to advance in degrading relations with the West. China cannot be anything but a partner of the West. China is the workshop of the world, so where is it going to sell?
• Putin has nothing in common with communism, mentally he is dominated by the KGB, if we want to understand Putin, we have to understand how the criminal world and the KGB works;
• Russian society can only react this way: the grandmother gives the car keys to her grandson, lets him run away. And 500,000 people ran away like that in a week. I was disappointed, I didn’t expect people not to react;
• Putin doesn’t know how to use the internet. After March 2020 his main source of information remained the FSB (…) Putin is shocked by the help Ukraine received from the West.
• Intelligence sources in Eastern Europe, all the services were modelled after the VCK, CEKA, GPU, NKVD, KGB, all these services are not intelligence services, they are criminal structures.
• (Why does Russia resist?) Russia has much, much greater resources. It also has much greater losses, but it has plenty to lose from. It has 147 million inhabitants. It has huge resources for this kind of entrenchment, that’s what Putin has banked on.
• At the end of this war, Russia should be unable to repeat it for at least two generations (…) It’s not just a war, it’s a realignment of the tectonic plates.
• Putin’s entourage: definitely Shoigu, definitely Patrushev, definitely not Dmitry Peskov. When you think of Putin, think criminal psychology, it helps.
• Navalny didn’t stay out of Russia because from the outside you don’t count. The FSB hates people who refuse to die, like Navalny.
• Putin has in mind the case of Milosevic who left with the guarantee that he would not be sent to The Hague. And he was sent to The Hague. Well, he (Putin) doesn’t want to go to The Hague.”

Asked by moderator Daniel Citirigă, PhD at the Faculty of History and Political Science, if he still believes that Vladimir Putin is the “gravedigger of Russia”, Armand Goșu pointed out that a man who wants to be the rebuilder of the empire, but leaves behind a disaster cannot be called anything else than “gravedigger”.

• “Do you think Russia will look better after this war? Do you think that a man obsessed with playing a historical role like Peter the Great and putting on the shirt of the one who ‘gathers the Russian lands’, a man who wants to be the rebuilder of the empire and leaves behind this disaster does not deserve the epithet ‘gravedigger’. In terms of objectives he achieves nothing. On the contrary, Russia’s place on the international stage is damaged after this horrible adventure (…) If before this war you could believe that the Russian army is the second best in the world, very well prepared, not to be messed with, can you now say that without a laugh?”.

The historian also argues that Russia is today becoming an annex and “junior partner” of China:

• “Russia today, which is becoming an annex, a junior partner of China, how does the security establishment’s obsession with Russia’s status these weeks reconcile? I’m entitled to use the word ‘gravedigger’ because it reflects reality, especially since this adventure is not over. The consequences could be far greater and far more serious.”

Asked what kind of state Russia looks like in terms of political organisation, Goșu explained that the regime in Russia is “degraded and moving towards dictatorship”, but the electoral illusion of the regime remains, as Putin needs this illusion to legitimise himself periodically. The historian also pointed out that Putin has nothing to do with communism, but is “mentally dominated by the KGB” and it is not excluded to expect a “switch with Medvedev or another Medvedev”:

• “Russia is an electoral authoritarian state. Or was, until 24 February. After 24 February it is already a state where the regime is degraded and moving towards dictatorship. The electoral illusion of the regime remains, Putin needs it because it legitimises him. At the beginning of next year, we may well see another rigged election. I don’t know how they will end, maybe we will have the surprise that Putin will make a switch with Medvedev or another Medvedev or maybe he will try a negotiated transfer of power, like in the 90s (…) Putin has nothing in common with communism, mentally he is dominated by the KGB, if we want to understand Putin, we have to understand how the criminal world and the KGB work. They often overlap.”

Audience interest varied around the idea of Russian propaganda and electoral manipulation: does Putin still have the strength and resources to fool and hold his population captive after two decades in power?

• “The sad answer is: Yes, he can. These regimes have enough resources. On the 21st of September there was the decree for partial mobilisation. Who protested? They protested in republics somewhere on the periphery, in Dagestan, where there is a different kind of social aggregation. The 70 years of communism destroyed any attempt at social aggregation. Russian society can only react so much: Grandma gives her grandson the car keys, lets him run away. And 500,000 people ran away in a week. I was disappointed, I didn’t expect people not to react. If people had come out, even in small numbers on the streets, the power would have stepped back. In Romania, the same thing, if you didn’t have the reaction to the €50,000 threshold, then you would have gotten it. That’s why civic education is important, so you are able to say that this is not the way to do it. In Russia the word “no” has been taken out of the vocabulary, Power is always right. In this context, in Romania you don’t need to know anything about involvement in Ukraine. The BBC journalist rightly asked the Foreign Minister if Romania is a democracy? You don’t need to know anything in Russia either”.

Asked whether it was true that Putin receives information kits and does not use the internet, Goșu said that “Putin does not know how to use the internet” and that since the COVID-19 pandemic, when he had extremely narrowed down the circle of those he met, Putin was left with only FSB information:

• “Putin doesn’t know how to use the internet. As in any authoritarian regime he has several sources of information. In recent years, because of the pandemic, he has greatly limited his sources of information, he has had no contact with anyone. After March 2020 his main source of information remained the FSB. And the sources of information, in Eastern Europe, all the services modelled on the VCK, CEKA, GPU, NKVD, KGB, all these services are not intelligence services, they are criminal structures. They appeared to protect the Power and kill the rest. Not being intelligence, they don’t know how to collect and analyse information. That explains why Putin took the blitzkrieg decision, he thought he could solve Ukraine in three days.”

One question on everyone’s lips is about Russia’s resilience: even as more and more experts point out that it has no modern weaponry, no strategy and no intelligence, Moscow is holding its own on the front lines and continuing the war of attrition. How is this possible?

• “We’re talking about a giant country that wants to defeat a country with limited resources. Russia has much, much greater resources. It also has much bigger losses, but it has plenty to lose from. It has 147 million inhabitants. It has huge resources for this kind of standoff, and that’s what Putin is banking on. After Kherson, Putin is fighting a war of exhausting the enemy, of attrition. His hope is to exhaust all of Ukraine’s resources, of international sympathy, of money, of ammunition. Putin does not accept that he can lose.”

Armand Goșu also said that Putin is most likely “shocked” by the West’s mobilisation and support for Ukraine and does not believe that extremist parties will be able to become the majority in Europe, as they are only waves of limited electorate.

• “The recent elections, in Finland for example. There is that process (the rise of extremist, anti-Western parties, ed.), it is real, but I think only a limited electorate can go towards 20%, in Romania I am curious how much it will grow, but it will not be a majority. As low as the education level of a people is, it is not suicidal.”

Goșu also pointed out that the key difference between the Crimean annexation episode and the February 24th invasion is that Ukrainians did not fight in 2014, unlike in 2022, thus explaining the West’s involvement.

The historian explained that the “deputinisation of Russia” can take various forms, depending on how the war ends, which is not a simple one, but one of “resetting the international tectonic plates”. On the other hand, the scenario in which Putin is removed from power will be assimilated by Russian society as a national humiliation by the West, Goșu adds:

• It depends on how Russia will lose. I assume that you don’t want in 20 years to go through another one of these or a worse difference, to see Russian ships in the Harbour of Constanta, coming into your apartments. Logically, at the end of this war, Russia should be unable to repeat this for at least two generations (…) I felt from the beginning that this is not a simple war, but that the tectonic plates in the world are being realigned (…) China is not suicidal enough to advance in degrading relations with the West. China cannot be anything other than a partner of the West. China is the workshop of the world, so where does it go to sell? (…) Yes, unfortunately. Propaganda is very high (if a “de-Putinization of Russia” will be equated in society with a “national humiliation” of the West, ed.).”

As for Putin’s entourage, the historian pointed out that it is not clear who else is close to the Kremlin leader, but “certainly Shoigu (Sergey Shoigu, Defence Minister, editor’s note), certainly Patrushev (Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian Security Council, certainly not Dmitry Peskov (Kremlin press secretary, editor’s note)”: “When you think of Putin, think of criminal psychology, it helps”.

Asked why Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny preferred to return to Russia after being poisoned and treated abroad, even though he knew he risked going to prison, Goșu explained that “Russians think differently”, and if he had stayed outside Russia “it wouldn’t have mattered”:

• “Because from outside you don’t count. He is Russian, he wanted to be a political leader, he wanted to be a hero, they think differently. The prosecutor asked for the maximum sentence for him, 25 years, and he preferred to go back. This is the big difference in mentality, in Romania you want to go abroad, in Russia they tie them up because they don’t want to leave, to be expelled (…) FSB hates those who refuse to die, like Navalny, for example”.

As for the future after Vladimir Putin, Armand Goșu explained that the scenarios depend very much on how the war will end, but as far as ceding power is concerned, Putin knows of only one model, that of Slobodan Milosevic, who eventually ended up at the International Criminal Court in The Hague:

“A lot depends on how this war will end. Putin knows only one model of power transfer, like in the 90s, the problem is that we are not in the 90s anymore. Putin has in mind the case of Milosevic who left power with the guarantee that he would not be sent to The Hague. And he was sent to The Hague. Well, he doesn’t want to go to The Hague.”